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We study the impact of the Euro on prices charged by online retailers within
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Eurozone. After controlling for cost, demand, and market structure eﬀects,
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11 Introduction
The Euro became a reality for consumers in twelve nations on 1 January 2002, when
it was introduced for retail transactions in all the participating countries.1 Prior to
this, retail transactions were conducted in local currencies. While there were many
macroeconomic and political reasons for the implementation of a single currency, one
consumer-based argument made in favor of the Euro’s introduction was that a sin-
gle currency would facilitate the transparency of prices across Europe and reduce
transactions costs associated with currency exchange. Pedro Solbes, the EU Com-
missioner for Economic and Financial Aﬀairs, suggested that, “Trading in the same
currency across borders lowers costs while cross border price transparency encourages
competition.”2
Presumably, the mechanism Solbes has in mind by which price transparency en-
courages competition is through increasing the intensity of consumer search across
countries. Internet price comparison sites oﬀer a natural place to look for such ef-
fects since geographic boundaries are irrelevant online and price transparency in this
setting makes it fairly easy for consumers to identify “bargains” and arbitrage price
diﬀerences within and among Eurozone countries.3 In this paper, we study the dy-
namics of online retail pricing in the period immediately before and immediately
after the retail introduction of the Euro to assess its impact, using retail price data
we collected from Kelkoo–the leading Internet price comparison site in the EU.
Our analysis is based on a dataset that has several features that distinguish it from
1The Euro was actually introduced as a currency in January 1999, but was not legal tender for
use by consumers in retail transactions until January 2002. Between January 1 and February 28,
2002 all retailers were required to accept payments in both their own local currency and the Euro.
From March 1, 2002, the Euro became the only legal currency in all members of the Eurozone.
2InfC =uro, Volume 15, 2000.
3By “arbitrage” we mean that, absent frictions, ﬁrms charging higher prices in one country
would be forced to exit owing to international competition. De Vries (1990) oﬀers a more thorough
treatment of arbitrage in internatinoal markets.
2the extant literature.4 We collected ﬁrm and price information from the Kelkoo sites
in seven EU countries: four in the Eurozone and three outside it. Our study focuses
on pricing for 28 products across a variety of product categories and price points.
We obtained price information during a period that straddled the introduction of the
E u r o ;t h u s ,w ea r ea b l et ol o o ka tv a r i a t i o nb o t hp r ea n dp o s tE u r oi n t r o d u c t i o na s
well as variation between pricing inside and outside the Eurozone. To our knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst study that oﬀers as many cross-country comparisons of online prices
and covers as broad a range of products.5 We believe this is one of the ﬁrst academic
studies of the impact of the introduction of the Euro on retail pricing.6 By including
four Eurozone and three non-Eurozone countries in the study, we examine what some
might view as a “natural experiment” on the impact of this important monetary
reform on pricing behavior.
W er e c o g n i z et h a tt h e r ea r ed i ﬀering views of the relevant transaction price to use
in comparing prices in online markets. Some have taken the position that identical
products sold by diﬀerent ﬁrms in online markets are homogeneous, and therefore that
a majority of consumers using a price comparison site will purchase at the minimum
listed price (Baye and Morgan, 2001). In this case, the relevant price to compare
pre and post-Euro is the minimum price. On the other hand, one might reasonably
argue that price diﬀerences for identical products stem from heterogeneities in service
4See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming) as well as Elberse, Barwise, and Hammond
(2002) for a survey of the literature.
5See Gatti and Kattuman (2003) for a more detailed analysis. However, Lehman (2001) studies
prices for package holidays from German online travel agencies. Latcovich & Smith (2001) study
online book markets in the UK. Clay and Tay (2001) examine the prices of textbooks sold by nine
online bookstores in North America, the United Kingdom and Germany, and report substantial
cross-country price dispersion.
6There is an evident trend of reduction in price dispersion across all EU countries after 1995.
Allington, Kattuman and Waldmann (2005) report that the EMU in 1999 triggered an acceleration of
price convergence in the Eurozone. There is no evidence of any additional eﬀect on price dispersion
following the adoption of Euro as a retail currency in 2001. Mastrobuoni (2003) exmaines the
diﬀerence betwee price perceptions and actual price changes following the Euro changeover.
3or reputations, and ﬁrms charging higher prices also enjoy sales (Narasimhan, 1988;
Pan et. al, 2001; and Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2004). In this case, the natural
comparison is the average price charged by all ﬁrms in the market. The absence
of sales data precludes us from discriminating between these two extreme views;
therefore, we study both average and best-quoted (minimum) prices online.
Figure 1 depicts the trend in the diﬀerence in prices over time. In this ﬁgure, we
plot the diﬀe r e n c ei nt h ea v e r a g ep r i c ea n dt h ed i ﬀerence in the average minimum price
between the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone on a weekly basis. Negative numbers
indicate that prices in the Eurozone are lower than those in the non-Eurozone and
positive ﬁgures indicate the reverse. As the ﬁgure shows, there is a clear upward trend
for both average prices and average minimum prices in the post-changeover period.
By the end of our study period, prices in the Eurozone are at least 10% higher than
those in the non-Eurozone. Figure 1 suggests that, contrary to what one might expect
based on the price transparency argument above, prices in the Eurozone increased
relative to non-Eurozone countries post-changeover.
Did the Euro changeover really have anything to do with this price increase? Our
main empirical ﬁnding is that even after controlling for a variety of demand, cost, and
market structure based alternative explanations, both average and minimum prices
increased in the Eurozone relative to the non-Eurozone post-changeover.
Are these results consistent with theoretical predictions? We oﬀer a model of
online pricing in which a currency union leads to the combination of (a) increased
consumer search intensity and (b) higher prices charged by ﬁrms. We compare this
model to a number of alternative models of strategic ﬁrm behavior that may also
explain a post-changeover price increase. We devise a test based on the language-
speciﬁcity of products to distinguish among these and ﬁnd results that are supportive
of the model of online pricing.
4The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop the
theoretical model of ﬁrm pricing. In Section 3 we describe the nature of the data used
in our study. Section 4 presents our statistical analysis of online prices controlling
not only for the Euro changeover, but also cost, demand, and market structure based
alternatives. We show that the pure Euro changeover eﬀect is to raise average prices
i nt h eE u r o z o n eb y3 %a n dm i n i m u mp r i c e sb y7 % . I nS e c t i o n5 ,w ec o m p a r ea
number of alternative models of strategic ﬁrm behavior with the model in Section 2
and oﬀer a test to distinguish among these. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Online Price Transparency
In this section, we show that, even if Commissioner Solbes is correct and the intro-
duction of the Euro fosters increased cross-country search on the part of consumers,
the equilibrium strategic response of retailers can have the eﬀect of raising prices
charged in the market.
Consider a “clearinghouse” model of online price competition where consumers
access the list of prices charged by diﬀerent ﬁrms. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten
(2004) show that this framework is useful for analyzing the competitive eﬀects of
price comparison sites, and that many standard models (including Varian, 1980)
are subsumed as a special case of a more general clearinghouse model. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that before the introduction of the Euro, there is a set M = {1,2,...,m} of
countries each of whom trades in a diﬀerent currency. In each country c ∈ M,t h e r e
is a set Nc = {1,2,..., nc} of identical ﬁrms who produce a product at a constant
marginal cost, θ,w i t hn oﬁxed costs and no capacity constraints. Demand for the
product in each country consists of a continuum of consumers each of whom wishes
to buy at most one unit of the good valued at r. All consumers have zero search
5costs. In country c, am a s sIc of these consumers are “shoppers”. Shoppers view
products as perfect substitutes. There are, however, considerable costs to purchasing
a product in a currency other than that of their home country. Thus, these consumers
will optimally search the price quotes of all ﬁrms in country c and buy from the
ﬁrm oﬀering the lowest price provided it does not exceed r. T h e r ei sa l s oam a s so f
customers Lc in country c w h oa r e“ l o y a l ”t os o m eﬁrm, f. These consumers value
the good produced by ﬁrm f at r and the products produced by all other ﬁrms at
zero. Thus, they will optimally search only ﬁrm f’s price and buy provided that it
does not exceed r. Suppose that loyal customers are evenly divided among the ﬁrms
of a given country; that is, each ﬁrm f ∈ Nc enjoys an equal share Uc = Lc/nc of
loyal customers.
It is well-known (see Varian, 1980) that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium




f (p)=( r − θ)Uc,




















where λc = Uc/Ic. Notice that the price distribution only depends on the ratio of
shoppers to loyal consumers in a given country and not on the overall size of the
consumer market.
Now amend the model as follows: Suppose that as a consequence of currency uni-
ﬁcation across the m countries, the currency costs to consumers in buying a product
sold outside their country drop to zero. This change clearly has no eﬀect on optimal
6search behavior of loyal customers, but does lead to increased search by shoppers.
In particular, shoppers within the currency union now optimally search the prices
oﬀered by ﬁrms in all countries in the currency union and buy from the ﬁrm oﬀer-
ing the lowest price. Notice that the intensity of consumer search unambiguously
increases following this change, and thus the number of ﬁrms eﬀectively competing
for “shoppers” increases. Given optimal search behavior by consumers, it remains to
characterize equilibrium prices. To analyze the eﬀects of a currency union, we make
the following additional assumptions, which we discuss below:
Assumption 1: Uc = U for all c.
Assumption 2: The proportion of shoppers to ﬁrms remains constant before
and after uniﬁcation; that is Ic/nc = Ig/ng, where Ig =
Pm
j=1 Ij and ng =
Pm
j=1 nj.
Clearly both assumptions are trivially satisﬁed if we consider symmetric countries
forming the union. More generally one can show that these assumptions follow as
implications of an entry model where ﬁrms may enter each local market by paying
a nonrecoverable entry cost that is identical across countries, and the fraction of
shoppers to loyals is the same across countries. In this case, countries with a greater
total number of loyal consumers attract more ﬁrms, such that, in equilibrium, the
number of loyal consumers per ﬁr mi st h es a m ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .I ft h eproportion of
loyal to informed consumers across markets is constant, then the proportion of ﬁrms
to informed customers will also be constant.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, it follows that, in the unique symmetric “post-Euro”
equilibrium, the expected proﬁts for each ﬁrm in country c remain
Eπ
c
f (p)=( r − θ)U,



















where λ = U/Ig; thus, λ<λ c.7
W ea r en o wi nap o s i t i o nt os t a t et h em a i nr e s u l t ,w h i c hi sp r o v e di nt h eA p p e n d i x :
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the formation of a
currency union:
a) Intensiﬁes consumer search; and
b) Raises the average price charged by ﬁrms operating in the currency union.
Furthermore,
c) For calibrated parameter values, the formation of a currency union raises the
average minimum price charged by ﬁrms operating in the currency union.
There are two eﬀects of a currency union. First, the ﬁrm in the Eurozone that
charges the lowest price now attracts shoppers from all Eurozone countries. Since
λ<λ c, the lower bound of the equilibrium distribution of prices within the Eurozone
declines as ﬁrms operating in the Eurozone compete more aggressively to “win” these
shoppers–this is the price reducing eﬀect, stemming from more intense search by
shoppers. The oﬀsetting eﬀect arises because each ﬁrm’s chance of capturing these
shoppers declines from 1/nc to 1/ng; thus, each ﬁrm competing in the Eurozone is
less likely to “win” the shoppers post-union. This increases the incentives of ﬁrms in
the Eurozone to raise prices to extract rents from their loyal customers.
Clearly, the overall eﬀect depends on the relative size of the changes in the number
of shoppers and the number of competing ﬁrms. Proposition 1 shows that whenever
t h et w ov a r yi nt h es a m ep r o p o r t i o n ,t h er e n te x t r a c t i o ne ﬀect dominates. Thus, the
7In particular, the proﬁtf u n c t i o no ft h eﬁrms in the model is isomorphic to the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
in the pre-Euro equilibrium shown above. Thus, we may directly apply the results of Varian (1980)
to obtain the characterization of the unique symmetric equilibrium.
8model outlined above points out that the strategic response of ﬁrms to a currency
union is far from straightforward. Indeed, there is the clear possibility that prices
might rise in e-retail markets following a currency union–even if the currency union
facilitates transparency and intensiﬁes consumer search. In the next sections, we
investigate this possibility empirically.
3D a t a
The price data for this study were downloaded from Kelkoo8 – the dominant price
listing service in Europe. Founded in France in 1999, Kelkoo rapidly expanded into
other European markets through mergers and acquisitions over the following two
years. Over the period of the study, Kelkoo was operating in eight countries–more
than any other price listing service in Europe. Across Europe, over 1 million distinct
users accessed Kelkoo sites every month. Based on statistics from Jupiter MMXI and
Hitwise Statistics, Kelkoo had the same name recognition among French Internet
u s e r sa sA m a z o n . K e l k o ow a sr a n k e da se i t h e rt h eﬁrst or second most accessed
price listing service in all eight countries, and was the leading price listing service
in the two countries with the most developed Internet retail markets (France and
the United Kingdom). It was accessed by over twice as many individual users each
month as its next closest rival in these two countries. Of the eight countries in
which Kelkoo operated, seven are members of the European Union (France, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, Denmark), and four (France, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain) are members of the Eurozone.9
8Speciﬁcally, the program GoZilla! was used to download the relevant pages from the various
Kelkoo sites. These ﬁles were then converted from html code into a format suitable for econometric
analysis by a specialist software company in India, Cordiant Interweb Technologies.
9Kelkoo also operated in Norway, and since the period of the study, has opened a price-listing
site in Germany.
9The layout and structure of the Kelkoo web pages are very similar in all coun-
tries, although the language used on each national web site varies. This similarity
in structure is an important aspect of the data collected as it mitigates price diﬀer-
ences stemming from diﬀerent web page layouts. Consumers on each site are oﬀered a
broad range of product categories, ranging from music and books to ﬁnancial services,
telephones and telephonic services, household appliances, computers, clothing, cars,
cosmetics, and so on. There are several ways of searching for particular products
within each category, but once a product is identiﬁed, Kelkoo provides a list of ﬁrms
selling the product, the prices charged, and additional information such as delivery
costs.
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the prices listed for the Palm m505 PDA in the
UK on 1 March 2002. Seven ﬁrms oﬀer the product, at seven diﬀerent prices ranging
from £281.99 to £ 349.99. With one further mouse-click, the consumer can enter the
Kelkoo site in six other EU countries and repeat the search. Consumers interested
in purchasing an item ‘click through’ from the Kelkoo page to the ﬁrm’s own web
site using the ‘More’ button. Kelkoo’s revenue is generated by charging ﬁrms a fee
for each consumer ‘click through’ generated to the ﬁrm’s web page. The fees charged
vary between product categories and countries, but range from C = 0 . 3 0t oC =1.50 per
‘click through’. Firms are not charged a ﬁxed fee to list on Kelkoo, although there is
an implicit cost of formatting data on the web site for access by Kelkoo. Consumers
are not charged any fees to access Kelkoo.
All prices used in this study include local sales taxes, exclude transportation and
delivery charges, and have been converted into Euros at the relevant daily exchange
rate.10 Tax rates on retail transactions vary across the countries monitored, ranging
10On all Kelkoo websites, Euro pricing was also phased in over the period. In October, all sites
reported prices in the domestic currency only. In December and January, prices in the Eurozone
member countries were reported in both the domestic currency and Euros. By May, the prices in
10from 16% in Spain to 25% in Denmark and Sweden.11 Including transportation
charges into the analysis has no impact on the results reported, as these charges are
small and do not strongly negatively covary relative to the observed prices.
We collected ﬁrm and price information from the Kelkoo sites in these seven EU
countries for 28 speciﬁc and well-deﬁned products across six main product categories:
Games, Game Consoles, Music, PDAs, Printers, and Scanners. Table 1 provides the
complete list of products organized by category. These products were selected to re-
ﬂect areas where Internet retailing was strongest and where product diﬀerences across
countries were smallest. All the products selected were identiﬁed to be selling well in
at least three countries at the start of the study. For each of these 28 products, ﬁrm-
speciﬁc price quotations were downloaded weekly from the Kelkoo websites for the
period 25 October 2001 until 7 June 2002, and we obtained 16,824 price observations.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Overview
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the data. For each summary statistic, we
separate the data into a set of 2×2 cells which divides the data into Eurozone/non-
Eurozone and Pre/Post changeover groups, where Pre-changeover refers to observa-
tions collected prior to 1 January 2002. Notice that the average product in our dataset
sells for between C =250 and C =274. Given that many of our products are subject to
either (a) rapid technological obsolescence; or (b) rapid changes in popularity (i.e.
games and music), one would expect that prices would fall over time. We see this
all Eurozone countries, except France, were being quoted in Euros only. Oddly, the French site was
still reporting prices in both Euros and Francs.
11Sales tax rates in the relevant countries are: Denmark 25%, Sweden 25%, Italy 20%, France
19.6%, Netherlands 19%, Britain 17.5%, and Spain 16%.
11price pattern for both the average price and average minimum price in non-Eurozone
countries. In contrast, notice that within the Eurozone, both the average price and
average minimum price actually increased after the introduction of the Euro. In fact,
during the changeover period, average prices in the Eurozone increased by 3.4% rela-
tive to non-Eurozone countries. Likewise, the average minimum price in the Eurozone
increased by 3.8% compared to non-Eurozone prices over the changeover period.
One similarity between US and European price comparison sites is the presence
of dispersed prices for similar products.12 One measure of price dispersion frequently
used in the literature (see, for instance, Carlson and Pescatrice, 1980) is the coeﬃcient
of variation, which is deﬁned as the sample standard deviation in prices divided by
the sample mean. Dispersion using this measure is reported in the fourth panel of
Table 2. The levels of price dispersion in Europe are slightly lower than what has
been observed for similar items oﬀered on price listing services in the US.13 Notice
that the average product in our dataset exhibits a coeﬃcient of variation between
6.9 and 9.3 percent. These levels of dispersion are also lower than the levels of
price dispersion found in conventional retail markets in the EU prior to the Euro
changeover.14 Another measure of price dispersion that has been reported for online
US markets is the range in prices–the percentage diﬀerence between the highest and
lowest posted price. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) report price ranges of about 33%
in their study of online pricing for books and CDs sold in the US. Our sample displays
smaller price ranges–between 18 and 28 percent. As the products in our sample aged,
average price dispersion, measured either by coeﬃcient of variation or price range,
12Of course, while the products themselves are identical, the ﬁrms might well diﬀer in return
policies, shipping speed, ease of buying at their sites, and so on. In principle, these heterogeneities
could be responsible for the price dispersion observed on price comparison sites in both Europe and
the US.
13See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004). See also the review of this literature in Gatti and
Kattuman (2003).
14See Commission of the European Communities, 2001.
12tended to increase; however, the rate of increase was higher in the Eurozone than
in the non-Eurozone post changeover.15 Thus, both price levels and price dispersion
increased in the Eurozone relative to the non-Eurozone after the Euro changeover.
Finally, notice for a given product sold in a given country, an average of 3 to 4
ﬁrms list prices at the Kelkoo site. As one would expect given the life cycles of the
products in our sample, the number of ﬁrms oﬀering a product declines in the post
changeover period. In the Eurozone, there is a 14% decline in the number of ﬁrms
oﬀering a typical product, while in the non-Eurozone, there is a 17% decline in the
number of ﬁrms. Since many economic models predict that reductions in the number
of competitors lead to higher prices, it will be important to control for this aspect of
the structure of the market in examining the eﬀect of the currency union.
4.2 Statistical Analysis
The model presented in Section 2 holds out the possibility that the strategic response
of ﬁrms to a currency union is to raise prices. While the price increases in the
Eurozone shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 are suggestive, they do not control for a
variety of factors inﬂuencing price apart from the strategic eﬀect identiﬁed above.









ict + γXict + εict (3)
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n(3) is the natural logarithm of a price statistic for
product i sold in country c at time t. B a s e do nt h em o d e li nS e c t i o n2 ,w er u ns p e c i ﬁ-
cations with two diﬀerent price statistics as the dependent variable. One speciﬁcation
uses the ﬁrm speciﬁc prices for product i in country c at time t as the dependent vari-
able. In the other speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is the minimum price charged
15A full analysis of changes in price dispersion over this period, using the same dataset, is reported
in Gatti and Kattuman (2003)
13for product i in country c at time t. Thus, the regression coeﬃcients in these two
speciﬁc a t i o n si n d i c a t et h ei m p a c to ft h ee x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e so nt h ea v e r a g ep r i c e
and average minimum price, respectively.
The right hand side of equation (3) captures the potential eﬀects of the introduc-
tion of the currency union. The expression DEZ
ict is a dummy variable that equals 1
if observation ict occurred in a Eurozone country and zero if not. The expression
DPost
ict is a dummy variable that equals one if observation ict occurred after the Euro
changeover, and zero if not.16 Proposition 1 predicts that, in both speciﬁcations, the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive, i.e., β>0. The value of β may be
i n t e r p r e t e da st h ep e r c e n t a g ei n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g e( o ra v e r a g em i n i m u m )p r i c ei n
the Eurozone relative to the non-Eurozone, post Euro. The expression Xict is the
following vector of controls used to isolate the strategic eﬀects of a currency union
from a variety of alternative explanations:
• Product dummies: We include product dummies to control for any hetero-
geneities across products that impact the level of prices. These dummies control
for diﬀerences across products in costs, demand, product popularity, and so on.
• Month dummies: We include month dummies to control for factors that lead to
general price variations across all countries, over time. Examples of such factors
include seasonal demand ﬂuctuations, such as Christmas, as well as cost shocks
common to ﬁrms operating in all countries.17
• Product and month interactions: Diﬀerent products in our sample are likely to
16We also run speciﬁcations where we interact the Eurozone dummy with a dummy for the month
in which the observation occurs. This is a simply a more ﬂexible form of the interaction term
d e s c r i b e di nt h et e x t .
17Since DPost
ict is a linear combination of month dummies occurring on or after January 2002, the
coeﬃcient α2 is absorbed by the month dummies.
14have diﬀerent product-life cycles. To control for product-speciﬁcl i f ec y c l ee f -
fects, as well as potential changes in product composition over time, we interact
dummies for each product and each month in our dataset.
• Numbers of competing ﬁrms: Many economic models predict that price levels
vary inversely with the number of competing ﬁrms. Thus, one possible explana-
tion for the price increase shown in Table 2 is simply that the number of com-
peting ﬁrms declined in the Eurozone at a faster rate than in the non-Eurozone
countries. To control for this possibility, we include a vector of dummy variables
for the number of competing ﬁrms. That is, we include a dummy, Dn
ict which is
equal to one if the number of ﬁrms listing prices for product ict is exactly n and
zero otherwise. This allows for the possibility of non-linear and non-monotonic
price eﬀects of diﬀerent number of ﬁrms listing prices.
Finally, the expression εict reﬂects the error term in the regression. To account for
the possibility of heteroskedasticity in the error term, we report robust t-statistics in
all regressions. To summarize, the remaining variation picked up in the β coeﬃcient
consists of price diﬀerences not attributable to product diﬀerences, time diﬀerences,
product life cycle/product composition eﬀects, or diﬀerences in the number of com-
peting ﬁrms. The β coeﬃcient is the ﬁrst entry in each of the tables discussed below.
Table 3 reports coeﬃcient estimates; note that Model 1 examines the impact of
the currency union on average prices, while Model 2 examines the impact on average
minimum prices. Model 1a in Table 3 shows that, controlling for the eﬀects discussed
above, post-changeover prices in the Eurozone increased by 2.3% relative to the non-
Eurozone. Model 1b decomposes the currency union eﬀect into price changes for each
month. Here, we see that the bulk of the price increase occurred in May and June.
Indeed, the coeﬃcients for this regression show that by June, average prices in the
15Eurozone increased about 7.8% relative to those in the non-Eurozone. Notice that
the only coeﬃcients attaining statistical signiﬁcance are positive and occur in the
post-changeover months. The magnitude of the regression coeﬃcients is quite similar
to the pattern we saw in Figure 1, suggesting that the pattern did not stem from
product composition eﬀects or changes in competition driven by diﬀerences in the
number of ﬁrms quoting prices. Notice that the coeﬃcient on α1 reveals that average
prices in the Eurozone were 4 to 5 percent lower than those in the non-Eurozone prior
to the changeover.
Model 2a in Table 3 shows that similar results occur when one looks at minimum
(or best-quoted) prices. Post-changeover, average minimum prices in the Eurozone
increased by 5.6 percent compared to the non-Eurozone. Looking month by month
in Model 2b, again we ﬁnd that the only coeﬃcients attaining statistical signiﬁcance
are positive and occur in the post-changeover period. Consistent with the results
on average prices, the coeﬃcient on α1 reveals that average minimum prices in the
Eurozone were 6 to 7 percent lower than those in the non-Eurozone prior to the
changeover.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that the general pattern observed
in Figure 1 and Table 2 is not an artifact of changes in market structure, product
composition, product life cycle eﬀects, or unobserved variables that covary with time
(such as the number of Internet users in the Eurozone relative to non-Eurozone).
Indeed, the positive and signiﬁcant value of the β coeﬃcients in these regressions is
consistent with Proposition 1. However, these speciﬁcations leave open a number of
other alternative explanations, which we discuss below.
Cost-Based Alternatives
While the above speciﬁcations control for common cost diﬀerences, it is possible
that the creation of a currency union raised the operating costs of Eurozone sellers
16diﬀerentially. This might occur due to the higher interest rates (and hence higher
cost of working capital) that prevailed post-changeover as the European Central Bank
struggled to stabilize the currency. It might also occur owing to diﬀerent wholesale
costs stemming from diﬀerential exchange rate ﬂuctuations of the Eurozone and non-
Eurozone countries with the US dollar–the currency of account for most wholesale
transactions for the class of products we study. These exchange rate variations could,
in principle, lead to higher costs for Eurozone retailers and these costs might sim-
ply be passed on to consumers. A third variant along these lines postulates that
other costs of doing business became diﬀerentially higher in the Eurozone than in
the non-Eurozone post-changeover. For instance, selling costs may have increased
diﬀerentially in the Eurozone during the period in which both the Euro and the
home currency co-circulated. Still another explanation is that macroeconomic shocks
raised input prices diﬀerentially in the Eurozone compared to the non-Eurozone post-
changeover.
To account for various cost-based alternatives, we add the following controls to
the model:
• Interest rate: We include the weekly domestic savings interest rate on deposit
accounts in a given country as a control for variation in the cost of working
capital. This control has the advantage that it allows for diﬀerences in the cost
of working capital between Eurozone members (unlike the Central Bank rate).
• Dollar exchange rate: We add the daily exchange rate between the domestic
currency of country c and the US Dollar. A rise in the US Dollar exchange
rate increases domestic costs for retailers. This variable attempts to control
for diﬀerential eﬀects of wholesale price shocks between Eurozone and the non-
Eurozone retailers. Since orders for product are typically placed in advance, we
17include lags of various lengths.
• Producer Price Index for consumer durables: We include the monthly, sea-
sonally adjusted PPI for each country. This variable attempts to control for
diﬀerential changes in the cost of goods over time and across countries.
• Unemployment rate: We add the monthly, seasonally adjusted, percentage un-
employment rate for each country. The unemployment rate is a crude control
for diﬀerences in direct labor costs across countries and across time.
• Industrial Production Index: We add the monthly, seasonally adjusted, Indus-
trial Production Index to reﬂect general supply conditions in a country.
Demand-Based Alternatives
Suppose that, as a consequence of the currency union, consumer conﬁdence rose
a n dt h i sl e dt oad i ﬀerential increase in consumer spending in Eurozone countries com-
pared to non-Eurozone countries. In that case, the positive β coeﬃcient observed in
Table 3 could reﬂect a shift outward in the demand curve within Eurozone countries.
Indeed, even under the assumption that retailers are perfectly competitive and non-
strategic, one would observe a diﬀerential price increase under these circumstances.
To account for demand based explanations, we add the following controls:
• Retail Sales Index: We include the monthly, seasonally adjusted Retail Sales
Index for each of the countries in the study. In the story above, the demand
shock would occur broadly in the economy and therefore, it should be captured
by variation in the index.
• Stock Market Index: We include the daily closing value of the dominant (blue
chip) index of stock market prices in each country. In the case of a positive
18demand shock, the eﬀects of an anticipated change in the stream of future
discounted cash ﬂows of companies in a given country should be reﬂected by a
change in the index. Thus, this control discriminates between transitory and
permanent demand eﬀects.
Finally, to ensure that the β coeﬃcient is not simply picking up changes in the
exchange rates between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, we include the
daily close of the Euro exchange rate with the relevant domestic currency. Clearly
this remains constant for all Eurozone members, but a rise in this variable will reduce
the Euro denominated price of products denominated in other currencies. To allow
direct comparison of changes in these variables over time, all variables are converted
into indices and normalized to 100 for October 2001.
The results of this speciﬁcation for equation (3) a r es h o w ni nT a b l e4 . N o t i c e
that the inclusion of controls for cost and demand based explanations does little
to alter the magnitude or signiﬁcance of the β coeﬃcient. Indeed, after including
these additional controls, we still ﬁn dt h a ta v e r a g eo n l i n ep r i c e sw i t h i nt h eE u r o z o n e
increased by about 3 percent relative to those outside of the Eurozone. Similarly,
average minimum prices within the Eurozone increased by about 7 percent compared
to non-Eurozone online prices.
5 Alternative Strategic Explanations
Having ruled out explanations for the observed price increase based on structural
and macroeconomic changes in the retail environment, we turn now to alternative
explanations based on strategic considerations by ﬁrms. Obviously, the model in
S e c t i o n2i so n es u c he x a m p l e .
Menu Costs: At the time of the changeover the popular press documented
19anecdotal evidence of price increases by conventional retailers, such as German ice
cream sellers. The explanation typically given was that these price increases stemmed
from menu costs. In particular, it was argued that the costs of adjusting prices to
the new currency led retailers within the Eurozone to delay making price changes
until just after the changeover. While we doubt that the costs of adjusting prices are
very great in the online markets we study, even if menu costs do play a signiﬁcant
role, the pattern of prices implied by this explanation is inconsistent with the product
characteristics of our dataset. Speciﬁcally, since the products we study tend to have
short life-cycles, one would expect that Eurozone retailers would delay passing on
price decreases to consumers until just after the changeover period. Thus, one should
see relatively higher prices within the Eurozone pre-changeover, followed by large
price decreases immediately after the changeover. This is the opposite of the pattern
observed in our data.
Double Marginalization: In competitive models, as well as the oligopolistic
Bertrand and Cournot models, increases in marginal costs are associated with higher
prices. We have corrected for general wholesale price changes in our regression models.
However, there may have been diﬀerential pricing responses to the changeover by
retailers within and outside the Eurozone. The eﬀective markup over wholesale price
that retailers are able to sustain will depend (inversely) on the elasticity of demand
in each market. For retail prices to have risen within the Eurozone it is necessary
that demand within the Eurozone countries was relatively more inelastic following
the changeover. This seems unlikely; if anything one would have expected demand
to become more elastic with the currency uniﬁcation.
Restart Eﬀect: A behavioral rationale is that the observed price increases stemmed
from a kind of “restart eﬀect” triggered by the currency change. Restart eﬀects have
20been widely documented in repeated prisoner’s dilemma type experiments.18 The
observed empirical regularity is that behavior is “cooperative” initially but becomes
more “competitive” in later rounds. However, if the experimenter “restarts” the game
after cooperation has broken down, behavior once again tends toward cooperation.
While restart eﬀects have not been studied in Bertrand laboratory experiments (to
our knowledge), Baye and Morgan (2004) observe a similar evolution from cooperative
to competitive behavior in these settings. Thus, to the extent that Kelkoo retailers
are mainly competing on the basis of price, their situation has similar properties.
Thus, it seems conceivable that the Euro changeover might have created a “restart
eﬀect” in online market–moving prices away from the competitive level and toward
cooperative (collusive) levels.
Transparency and Collusion: A related rationale is that the improved trans-
parency of the Euro acted as a facilitating practice making it easier for ﬁrms to
monitor and punish their rivals for “cheating” by lowering prices. This explanation
seems very unlikely given the already high levels of price transparency of online prices
that existed prior to the changeover and the fact that most competition is within
country. Nonetheless, it is theoretically possible that improved monitoring post-Euro
permitted the implementation of more carefully calibrated punishment strategies and
thereby facilitated high price equilibria.
Distinguishing Alternative Strategic Hypotheses
How can we distinguish among these competing alternative hypotheses and the
model in Section 2? One useful way to proceed is to return to that model and amend
it slightly as follows: Suppose that the product being sold by the competing ﬁrms is
either language-speciﬁc or not. If it is not, then the amended model is identical to that
in Section 2. For a language-speciﬁc product, however, all shoppers in country c view
18See Andreoni and Croson (forthcoming) for a useful survey.
21the oﬀerings of ﬁrms in country c to be perfect substitutes. However, products oﬀered
outside of country c, due to the language-speciﬁcity of the products, are useless to
these consumers. It is straightforward to see that in the amended model, a currency
union will have no eﬀect whatsoever on the distribution of prices for language-speciﬁc
products.
The key thing to notice is that none of the alternative explanations depended
on the language-speciﬁcity of the product in question.19 This suggests dividing the
dataset between language-speciﬁc and non language-speciﬁc products and running
separate regressions using equation (3) on each portion of the data.20 We designated
the categories games and PDAs as being language-speciﬁc owing to the fact that an
otherwise identical product in these categories sold in diﬀerent countries will diﬀer
signiﬁcantly as language plays a key role in the displays of information. The remaining
items we designated as non language-speciﬁc. Indeed, identical versions of these
products are routinely sold across countries.
Table 5 reports the results for these regressions; all include the controls for product
characteristics, seasonality, product life cycle eﬀects, as well as the cost and demand
controls discussed in the previous section. Notice that the β coeﬃcients are positive
and signiﬁcant in the non language-speciﬁc regressions (Models 5b and 6b), but are
not statistically diﬀerent from zero in the language-speciﬁc regressions (Models 5a
and 6a). These results suggest that the Euro changeover did not impact the average
(or average minimum) prices of language speciﬁc products sold within the Eurozone,
but did lead to increases in the prices of language-speciﬁc products sold within the
Eurozone. Indeed, relative to prices outside of the Eurozone, the average price of non
19We gratefully acknowledge the suggestion of an anonymous referee for directing us to think
along these lines.
20An alternative would be to run a single regression and add a dummy variable for whether
a product was language speciﬁc or not. Note, however, that such an approach precludes adding
product-month interactions which, we argued, are important to control for.
22language-speciﬁc products increased by 6.1 percent after the changeover; the average
minimum price increased by 7.4 percent. On balance, the results in Table 5 appear
more consistent with the clearinghouse rationale presented in Section 2 than with the
alternatives suggested above.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This study spans the introduction of the Euro, on 1 January 2002, and monitors
prices in a subset of Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries using the popular Internet
price comparison site, Kelkoo. Our main ﬁnding is that the introduction of the Euro
was associated with an increase, rather than a reduction, in both average and average
minimum prices online. This ﬁnding is robust to controls for cost, demand and market
structure factors. Speciﬁcally, relative to non-Eurozone countries, average prices in
the Eurozone rose by 3% and average minimum prices in the Eurozone rose by 7%
during the changeover period.
We also showed that, somewhat surprisingly, these patterns are consistent with
the predictions of so-called “clearinghouse” models of online price competition. In
these models, a currency union reduces transactions costs and thereby permits a
subset of consumers in the Eurozone (the “shoppers”) to purchase from the ﬁrm
oﬀering the lowest (global) price within the currency union. For instance, prior to
the introduction of the Euro, Dutch “shoppers” tended to purchase (in guilders) from
the ﬁrm in the Netherlands oﬀering the lowest online price; post-Euro, they were able
to purchase (in Euros) from the ﬁr mi nt h eE u r o z o n el i s t i n gt h el o w e s to n l i n ep r i c e .
The strategic response is to raise average prices: Any particular ﬁrm in the Eurozone
i sl e s sl i k e l yt oc a p t u r et h e s e“ s h o p p e r s ”( d o i n gs or e q u i r e si tt ob e a tt h ep r i c e so f
ﬁrms in all Eurozone countries), and so responds by increasing prices to capture rents
23from their loyal customers.
We note that a key element of this theoretical rationale is that, post-Euro, some
“shoppers” in the Eurozone are willing to purchase from ﬁrms listing on a foreign
language Kelkoo site; that is, a suﬃcient number of “shoppers” in our Eurozone
countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain) are multilingual enough to navigate
all of these sites.21 How many “multilingual shoppers” would it take to induce the
observed 3% increase in average prices? To address this issue, we calibrated the
model in Section 2 with our data.22 The calibration reveals that, to explain all of
this increase, one would need 17 percent of the online consumers to be “multilingual
shoppers.” This does not seem entirely implausible – after all, the layout of the
Kelkoo screens are similar across countries (thus a shopper need not be ﬂuent in
these four languages to realize the signiﬁcant cost savings), and “wired” (online)
customers tend to be better-educated than their oﬄine counterparts. Even if only
10% of the online consumers in these four countries were “multilingual shoppers,”
the calibration reveals that the Euro changeover would have increased average prices
by about 1.5 percent. The calibration exercise, coupled with our ﬁndings in Table 5,
suggests that at least part of the observed increase in average prices may stem from
the eﬀects summarized in Proposition 1.
In concluding, it is important to stress that our results are based on only 28
products sold online within the EU. It is an open question whether the changes
observed in our data extend to conventional retail markets within the Eurozone. In
light of the relatively short duration of our study, it is also an open question whether
21We are indebted to an anonymous referee for forcing us to more carefully think about this issue.
22The calibration is based on the following parameter values: nc =4(the average number of ﬁrms
per country in our sample), m =4(the number of Eurozone countries in our sample), r =C =270 (the
average maximium price in our sample), and θ =C =127 (the average minimum price in our sample).
24the observed eﬀects are short-term or lasting. The results presented here suggest that
these are potentially important avenues for future research.
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28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. a) Follows from the argument for optimizing consumer
behavior given in the text.


























































Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that dEPost-Euro[p]/dv > 0. To establish this, let z = vnc
denote the total number of competitors, write the distribution of prices as a function
of z only, and apply Proposition 3 in Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (forthcoming).
c )R e c a l lt h a tt h ec .d .f .o ft h el o w e s to fn draws from F is:
F(n) (x) ≡ Pr(min(p1,...,p n) <x )
=1 − (1 − F (x))
n










while the distribution of the country speciﬁc lowest price after the introduction of the











29Based on the data, the calibrated values of the parameters are (see Section 6 of the
text) m =4 ,n c =4 ,θ=1 2 7 , and r = 270.F u r t h e r m o r e , λc =1 .22 corresponds
to the environment where 17 percent of online consumers are “shoppers.” Numerical

































dp =2 3 0 .31
Thus, for calibrated parameter values, the expected minimum price charged in each
country increases as a result of a currency union.
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Epson Expression 1600 Pro
HP ScanJet 5300CTable 2: Summary Statistics
Statistic Pre-Changeover Post-Changeover
Average Price in Euros
Eurozone 250 253
Non-Eurozone 274 268
Average Minimum Price in Euros
Eurozone 231 238
Non-Eurozone 256 254






Price Range (Range normalised by Min Price)**
Eurozone 0.18 0.22
Non-Eurozone 0.25 0.28
Average Number of Firms
Eurozone 4.01 3.43
Non-Eurozone 4.37 3.64
Number of Price Observations
Eurozone 3862 5341
Non-Eurozone 3318 4303
* Note that all prices include sales tax for the relevant country of origin.
 Excluding sales taxes does not affect the statistics. 
* * Includes zero values for single firm listingsDependent Variable:
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
β: Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates after 1 Jan 2002 0.023 (4.50)*** 0.056 (-5.51)***
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in November 2001 0.006 (0.53) 0.004 (0.2)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in December 2001 0.016 (1.29) 0.019 (0.83)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in January 2002 0.009 (0.69) 0.034 (1.44)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in February 2002 0.046 (3.73)*** 0.07 (2.98)***
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in March 2002 0.004 (0.31) 0.04 (1.64)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in April 2002 0.021 (1.34) 0.056 (2.03)**
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in May 2002 0.056 (4.06)*** 0.094 (3.61)***
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in June 2002 0.078 (3.88)*** 0.162 (3.50)***
α1: Eurozone -0.041 (-11.61)*** -0.049 (-4.74)*** -0.061 (-8.63)*** -0.071 (-3.75)***
Product dummies
Month dummies
Product life cycle effects: Product dummies*Month dummies
Number of firms dummies
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Table 3: Effects of the Euro changeover on Prices
Model 1a                   (Log 
Price)
Model 1b                   (Log 
Price)
Model 2a               
(Log Minimum Price)
Model 2b                   (Log 
Minimum Price)Dependent Variable:
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
β: Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates after 1 Jan 2002 0.033 (4.54)*** 0.072 (4.88)***
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in November 2001 0 (0.02) 0.008 (0.35)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in December 2001 0.012 (0.91) 0.027 (1.09)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in January 2002 0.022 (1.58) 0.04 (1.44)
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in February 2002 0.054 (3.77)*** 0.087 (3.05)***
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in March 2002 0.009 (0.6) 0.057 (1.95)*
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in April 2002 0.02 (1.19) 0.069 (2.16)**
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in May 2002 0.047 (3.11)*** 0.112 (3.79)***
Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates in June 2002 0.068 (3.25)*** 0.171 (3.59)***
α1: Eurozone -0.054 (-10.64)*** -0.059 (-5.46)*** -0.071 (-7.13)*** -0.086 (-4.36)***
Cost Side Controls
   Interest rate on Deposits (Index Oct2001=100) 0.001 (3.18)*** 0.001 (2.50)** 0.001 (1.62) 0 (0.46)
   Dollar exchange rate (Index Oct2001=100): Lagged 4 wks -0.001 (-0.7) -0.001 (-0.99) -0.004 (-1.55) -0.005 (-1.84)*
   Dollar exchange rate (Index Oct2001=100): Lagged 12 wks 0.002 (1.57) 0.001 (0.94) 0 (0.05) -0.001 (-0.59)
   Dollar exchange rate (Index Oct2001=100): Lagged 20 wks 0.003 (2.78)*** 0.003 (3.03)*** 0.004 (1.93)* 0.005 (2.07)**
   Producer price index (Oct2001=100) 0.005 (1.43) 0.006 (1.62) 0.001 (0.19) 0.003 (0.38)
   Unemployment rate (Index Oct2001=100) 0.001 (1.96)* 0 (1.41) 0 (0.49) -0.001 (-1.67)*
   Industrial production (Index Oct2001=100) 0 (1.5) 0 (1.34) -0.001 (-2.88)*** -0.001 (-2.08)**
Demand Side Controls
   Retail sales (Index Oct2001=100) -0.001 (-3.84)*** -0.001 (-2.76)*** -0.001 (-0.93) 0 (0.13)
   Stock market Index (Oct2001=100) 0 (0.69) 0 (0.75) 0 (0.46) 0 (0.08)
Euro exchange rate (Dom/Euro: Index Oct2001=100) -0.004 (-1.62) -0.001 (-0.43) -0.008 (-1.73)* -0.002 (-0.3)
Product dummies
Month dummies
Product life cycle effects: Product dummies*Month dummies
Number of firms dummies
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Yes Yes Yes









Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model 4a               
(Log Minimum Price)
Model 4b              
(Log Minimum Price)
Table 4: Effects of the Euro changeover on Prices
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model 3a               
(Log Price)
Model 3b              
(Log Price)
YesDependent Variable:
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
β: Eurozone interacted with dummy for dates after 1 Jan 2002 -0.008 (-0.15) 0.061 (2.66)** 0.063 (0.53) 0.074 (2.33)**
α1: Eurozone -0.035 (-0.92) -0.063 (-3.68)*** -0.034 (-0.94) -0.09 (-3.54)***
Cost side controls
   Interest rate on Deposits (Index Oct2001=100) 0 (0.26) 0.001 (1.58) -0.001 (-0.44) 0.002 (1.89)*
   Dollar exchange rate (Index Oct2001=100): Lagged 4 wks -0.005 (-0.65) 0.002 (0.8) -0.008 (-0.67) -0.002 (-0.56)
   Dollar exchange rate (Index Oct2001=100): Lagged 12 wks 0.002 (0.63) 0.001 (1.19) 0.001 (0.23) -0.001 (-0.53)
   Dollar exchange rate (Index Oct2001=100): Lagged 20 wks -0.001 (-0.4) 0.006 (3.92)*** -0.004 (-1.03) 0.01 (4.44)***
   Producer price index (Oct2001=100) 0.006 (0.38) 0.001 (0.18) 0.013 (0.76) -0.009 (-0.71)
   Unemployment rate (Index Oct2001=100) 0.001 (0.45) 0 (0.53) 0 (0.02) 0 (0.43)
   Industrial production (Index Oct2001=100) -0.001 (-0.75) 0 (0.21) -0.003 (-1.25) 0 (0.31)
Demand Side controls
   Retail sales (Index Oct2001=100) -0.001 (-0.5) -0.001 (-2.29)** 0.002 (0.8) -0.002 (-1.43)
   Stock market Index (Oct2001=100) 0.001 (1.4) 0 (0.69) 0.001 (0.73) 0 (0.03)
Euro exchange rate (Dom/Euro: Index Oct2001=100) -0.003 (-0.82) -0.005 (-1.26) -0.007 (-0.82) -0.01 (-1.43)
Product dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product life cycle effects: Product dummies*Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6808 10016 1730 2731
Adjusted R-squared 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Model 6a : Language-Specific 
Products 
(Log Minimum Price)
Model 6b : Non Language-
Specific Products 
(Log Minimum Price)
Table 5: Effects of the Euro changeover on Prices (Language Sensitive Product Categories vs. Categories that are not Language Sensitive)
Model 5a : Language-Specific 
Products 
(Log Price)
Model 5b : Non Language-
Specific Products 
(Log Price)